The FXI is involved on an ongoing basis in activities around broadcasting, following on from the work of its predecessor organisation, the Campaign for Open Media. It has concerned itself with lobbying for the independence of national and provincial broadcasters, in addition, arguing for strategies to ensure a diversification of the electronic media.

The new South Africa inherited a broadcasting system which was skewed largely in favour of whites. The system was dominated by the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), a state broadcaster which acted as a mouthpiece of the ruling national party. The granting of broadcast licences was strictly controlled by the government.

Broadcasting policy review
In 1997, the Department of Communications initiated a review of broadcasting policy to bring it into line with the democratic values of the constitution (adopted in 1996). The FXI participated in this review by responding to the Green Paper on Broadcasting (for FXI response to Green Paper on Broadcasting, click here).The Department then produced a White Paper on Broadcasting Policy, which formed the basis for new legislation called the Broadcasting Bill. The Bill was released for public comment in August 1998, and the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Communications held public hearings on the Bill in September. The FXI presented a submission on the Bill to the Portfolio Committee (for the submission, click here), which was based on a research document analysing the Bill in relation to legislation in other countries (for this document, entitled Response to Broadcasting Bill, click here). The minutes of the Portfolio Committee hearings, and copies of submissions presented by different organisations, are to be found on the website of the Parliamentary Monitoring Group(click here). The Bill has yet to be passed into law.

In addition, the FXI has published numerous articles on the consultation process around broadcasting policy, and the policy itself. To download each article, click below:

• 'Sacrificing SABC's freedom?' (published in Sowetan, 18/03/1998);
• Shifting Broadcasting into GEAR, Update, (published in Sowetan, 29/05/1998 as Broadcasting's Mixed Signals');
• 'Broadcasting at a Crossroad' (published in the Star, 5/10/1998);
• 'Broadcasting Policy Leaves Women in the Cold' (published in Reconstruct, 8/11/1998).
• 'Gambling with the Future of the SABC' (published in Business Day, March 1999)

SABC Board Task Team Review
Early in 1999, the FXI also became involved in controversies around the SABC's news and current affairs unit, which led to the Board launching an investigation into editorial independence and other matters in the Corporation. The FXI responded with a submission (FXI submission to the SABC Board's Enquiry into Editorial Independence and other matters ), and was then asked by the Board to make a further submission on the SABC's bi-media news operation (Further submission on bi-media to the SABC Board's enquiry into editorial independence). We also published two articles on the SABC's bi-media operation:

• Is the merger of radio and television doomed to failure?
• SABC's bi-media operation in urgent need of review?

Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA)
One of the key activities of the FXI is to ensure that the IBA fulfils its constitutional mandate of regulating broadcasting in the public interest, while ensuring fairness and a diversity of views broadly representing South African society. A decision was taken as far back as 1997 to merge the IBA and the telecommunications regulatory authority. This move raised concerns that the IBA's independence may be compromised as it is more independent than SATRA (in fact, the IBA's independence is guaranteed in the constitution, whereas SATRA's is not). Controversies have also ensued about whether the IBA is in fact enjoying sufficient independence from the government, as well as other institutions set up in terms of Chapter 9 of the Constitution (like the Commission on Gender Equality and the South African Human Rights Commission).

In response to these controversies, the speaker of Parliament commissioned a study into the oversight functions of Parliament with respect to the executive arm of government, and the 'Chapter 9' institutions. The FXI contributed to this report with respect to the independence and accountability of the IBA (Independent Broadcasting Authority: Independence vs. Accountability ? A report). The report was released in July 1999, and is still being discussed in Parliament.

The FXI, together with the National Community Radio Forum, also commented on the South African Communications Regulatory Authority Bill, which is still being debated in Parliament (FXI and NCMF submission on SA Communications Regulatory Authority Bill).

Earlier activities around broadcasting

Broadcasters inherited from the former homelands
The FXI has also been involved in examining the fate of state broadcasters inherited from the former homelands which were reintegrated into South Africa in 1994. Numerous freedom of expression issues surfaced during this period, which the FXI intervened in. Two of these are dealt with below:

The Bophuthatswana Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)
In an ill-considered move, control of the BBC was delegated from the central Government to the North West provincial Government by the Government of National Unity early in 1994. This development erupted into a controversy in July 1994 when the North West Government directly appointed a new Director-General for the BBC. The person appointed was further an ANC member, which sharpened the perception that an ANC regional government had simply appointed a reliable member to run the regional public broadcaster in the regional government's interest.

This appointment flew in the face of the philosophy underlying the appointment of the new SABC Board. The public process of appointment is the method by which the SABC won its independence of Government. This independently appointed Board then has the responsibility of appointing the chief executive officer of the broadcaster and any other group executive appointments. The government should have no say in these appointments. Obviously all such procedures were flouted in the case of the appointment of the director-general of the BBC (see FXI press statement, 22 July 1994 and letter to Regional Premiere of the North-West, Mr. Popo Molefe )

During the latter part of 1994 the FXI participated in a regional workshop in the North West to discuss broadcasting matters in the region, and made its protest at this development known. It also met with the Premier of the North West, Mr Popo Molefe, in September to convey its protest in person. Mr Molefe informed the FXI that the appointment of this Director-General was temporary until a new regional law had been enacted which would provide for a publicly nominated Board to take control. In future that Board would make all executive appointments at the BBC. This law fell far short of ensuring the independence of the BBC from the regional Government.

Task Group appointed by the Minister of Broadcasting

The FXI protested about the above state of affairs in writing to the-then national Minister of Posts, Telecommunications and Broadcasting, Dr Pallo Jordan, early in 1995. He launched an initiative at which the future of all regional public broadcasters were reviewed in relation to the national public broadcaster. The issue was one of whether the regional broadcasters should be incorporated into the national public broadcaster, and fall under the control of the independent SABC Board.

The Task Group appointed by Minister Jordan recommended that such incorporation take place, but details of the process were protested by the BBC. Various regional governments also indicated that they may want such broadcasters under their control in terms of Schedule 6 of the interim Constitution which allowed for this eventuality if certain other conditions are met. These include proof of their administrative capacity to administrate a public broadcaster.

To this end, the FXI was requested by Directors of Communication of the nine provinces of South Africa to provide it with a legal opinion at a seminar held in April 1995 as to whether these provinces are entitled to start up regional public broadcasters of their own (see FXI document on setting up provincial public broadcasters). Of particular concern was the fact that the Independent Broadcasting Authority(IBA) also appeared to have legal jurisdiction over provincial public broadcasters, and therefore a constitutional conflict existed at present as to precisely who had jurisdiction over such broadcasters. This legal conflict was resolved when the final constitution was adopted in 1996, which clarified that provincial governments do not have the right to claim ownership of the broadcasters in question.

In 1996, the FXI also responded to a draft Bill on public broadcasting, which was issued for public comment. The purpose of the Bill was to set common standards for all public broadcasters in South Africa(see FXI submission on Draft Public Services Bill). The Bill was withdraw when the final constitution came into effect, as it was based on the legal provisions of the Interim Constitution.

The IBA Triple Inquiry From 1994 to 1995, the IBA conducted a major public inquiry to assist it in determining broadcast policies. Among others, a major theme of the inquiry was the protection and viability of public broadcasters.

The FXI made a written and oral submission to the IBA to enshrine in law the public appointment procedure of Boards of public broadcasters to guarantee their independence from either national or regional governments in South Africa (see FXI submission on protection and viability of the PBS). Recommendations based on those of the FXI were drafted by the IBA and were recommended to the Minister of Broadcasting for enactment in legislation.

The FXI also made written and oral submissions on the issues of cross-media ownership and local content to the IBA (see FXI submissions on cross-media ownership and local content ).

The new South Africa has inherited a number of public broadcasters, the largest of which is the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC). Other have limited regional broadcasting capabilities, and have been inherited from the old homelands which have since been incorporated into South Africa. These include the Bophuthatswana Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Transkei Radio and Television, Ciskei Radio and Radio Thohoyandou. These broadcasters have a legacy of editorial control by the governments of the day: this legacy now needs to be expunged and a new tradition of structural and editorial independence established.

Although the Board of the SABC was appointed by a process of public nomination and public hearings pioneered by a predecessor organisation of the FXI, the Campaign for Independent Broadcasting (CIB), this is not the case with the remaining regional public broadcasters. In addition, the process of appointing the SABC Board is not enshrined in law. To complicate matters, in an ill-considered move, control of the BBC was delegated from the central Government to the North West provincial Government by the Government of National Unity early in 1994.

The Bophuthatswana Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)

This development erupted into a controversy in July 1994 when the North West Government directly appointed a new Director-General for the BBC. The person appointed was further an ANC member, which sharpened the perception that an ANC regional government had simply appointed a reliable member to run the regional public broadcaster in the regional government's interest. 

This appointment flew in the face of the philosophy underlying the appointment of the new SABC Board. The public process of appointment is the method by which the SABC won its independence of Government. This independently appointed Board then has the responsibility of appointing the chief executive officer of the broadcaster and any other group executive appointments. The government should have no say in these appointments. Obviously all such procedures were flouted in the case of the appointment of the director-general of the BBC (see FXI press statement, 22 July 1994 and letter to Regional Premiere of the North-West, Mr. Popo Molefe)

During the latter part of 1994 the FXI participated in a regional workshop in the North West to discuss broadcasting matters in the region, and made its protest at this development known. It also met with the Premier of the North West, Mr Popo Molefe, in September to convey its protest in person. Mr Molefe informed the FXI that the appointment of this Director-General was temporary until a new regional law had been enacted which would provide for a publicly nominated Board to take control. In future that Board would make all executive appointments at the BBC.

This law has now been enacted and falls far short of ensuring the independence of the BBC from the regional Government. Needless to say, the appointment of the Director-General appointed by this Government has simply been confirmed in the long term.

Task Group appointed by the Minister of Broadcasting

The FXI protested the above state of affairs in writing to the national Minister of Posts, Telecommunications and Broadcasting, Dr Pallo Jordan, early in 1995. He launched an initiative at which the future of all regional public broadcasters were reviewed in relation to the national public broadcaster. The issue is one of whether the regional broadcasters should be incorporated into the national public broadcaster, and fall under the control of the independent SABC Board. 

The Task Group appointed by Minister Jordan has recommended that such incorporation take place, but details of the process have been protested by the BBC. Various regional governments have also indicated that they may want such broadcasters under their control. They are empowered by Schedule 6 of the interim Constitution in terms of which control of regional public broadcasters must be ceded to them if certain other conditions are met. These include proof of their administrative capacity to administrate a public broadcaster. However, the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) also appears to have legal jurisdiction over provincial public broadcasters, and therefore a constitutional conflict exists at present as to precisely who has jurisdiction over such broadcasters. The IBA is the body who has to licence all broadcasters in South Africa, including all public broadcasters according to the IBA Act.

The IBA Triple Inquiry

Fom 1994 to 1995, the IBA conducted a major public inquiry to assist it in determining broadcast policies. Among others, a major theme of the inquiry was the protection and viability of public broadcasters. 

The FXI made an important written and oral submission to the IBA to enshrine in law the public appointment procedure of Boards of public broadcasters to guarantee their independence from either national or regional governments in South Africa (see FXI submission on protection and viability of the PBS). We were the only body to call on the IBA to do so. Recommendations based on those of the FXI have been drafted by the IBA and has been recommended to the Minister of Broadcasting for enactment in legislation.

In this submission the FXI also recommended that the SABC should carry no advertising so as to enable the licensing of more private commercial television channels. The general consensus, supported by research conducted by the IBA, is that there is not enough television advertising available in South Africa to support more than one national private television broadcaster while the public broadcaster continues to carry advertising.

The FXI is of the view that the SABC should be entirely State funded. This is a fundamentally different concept than that of Government funded. The funds allocated should be approved by a multi-party consensus vote in Parliament. This would indicate that the funds are not being allocated by the Government of the day. Further, we would regard such a duty of the State as no different to that of providing water and electricity to consumers.

The funds could be raised through either the imposition of VAT or as a direct levy through the office of the Receiver of Revenue. The latter proposal could be exercised with no additional cost to the State or the taxpayer, because the infrastructure for the Receiver's Office already exists. The FXI calculated that if existing taxpayers only were levied for a specific amount (the same as the present television licence fee), the State would be able to accumulate enough funds to meet the budgetary requirements of the SABC. This would be achieved by the SABC cutting its costs in respect of its advertising department as well as its licencing department. The latter is completely ineffectual and often more money is spent on trying to collect licence fees than in the amount of fees actually collected.

The proposal does mean that only taxpayers will pay for public broadcasting in South Africa, and we do understand that this principle is debatable. We believe, however, that in time the Receiver's Office will become more effective in registering more taxpayers and ideally all persons in the country with incomes should be paying tax and should be registered.

We also believe it inappropriate that advertising be carried on the public broadcaster because it does substantially and fundamentally undermine the editorial integrity of all programming on the SABC. It should be noted that to this day the British Broadcasting Corporation carries no advertising.

The FXI chairperson, Mr Raymond Louw, met recently with Minister Jordan to explain this proposal in more detail and Dr Jordan has indicated that he has studied the proposal with "great interest"

The FXI also made written and oral submissions on the issues of cross-media ownership and local content to the IBA and these are appended (see FXI submissions on cross-media ownership and local content).

Provincial broadcasters

In addition, the FXI was requested by Directors of Communication of the nine provinces of South Africa to provide it with a legal opinion at a seminar held in April 1995 as to whether these provinces are entitled to start up regional public broadcasters of their own (see FXI document on setting up provincial public broadcasters). This is a contentious political issue apart from the legal issues involved. The debate about whether this would be desirable has not yet been settled. The issue really is whether regional governments would respect the independence of public broadcasters in their provinces. The motivation of these governments are that they do not receive sufficient coverage by the national public broadcaster, the SABC. They therefore want public broadcasters so that these broadcasters will report on the activities of the regional governments. Some of their proposals include that the governments must have guaranteed air time on the broadcaster -- a very contentious issue from the FXI's point of view. 

The FXI is not opposed to regional public broadcasters in principle if citizens of those regions truly want them, but we would demand that the broadcasters are independent and that journalists will have the right to independently decide programming and content without any interference from the regional governments. Practically, however, regional governments do not generally have enough funds to finance regional public broadcasters and further more, we do not believe that most of them are politically mature enough to respect the independence of such broadcasters. For these reasons we recommended to the IBA that the existing regional broadcasters be incorporated with the SABC under the control of an independent SABC Board. This Board should be restructured, however, to ensure seats for publicly nominated regional representatives.

The FXI has therefore been able to convey its views about editorial independence and the independence of public broadcasters generally to all the provinces in South Africa and has made progress towards legislating the independent and public appointment process of Boards of public broadcasters.

More recently, the FXI also responded to a draft Bill on public broadcasting, which has been issued for public comment. The purpose of the Bill is to set common standards for all public broadcasters in South Africa (see FXI submission on Draft Public Services Bill).

Press statement on developments at the Bophuthatswana Broadcasting Corporation (BBC).

The Freedom of Expression Institute (FXI) believes that developments at the Bophuthatswana Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) this week makes a mockery of the Government of National Unity's professed commitment to the independence of the broadcast media and presents a major reversal of democratic media policies and practices established over the last two years.

The government of the North-West region announced on Thursday that it had appointed a new Director-General of the BBC.

Direct government appointments of managerial persons in public broadcasters is an utterly discredited practice characteristic of totalitarian regimes.

The North West government said in a statement on Thursday it had taken over administrative control of the BBC by virtue of a proclamation approved by President Mandela and his Cabinet and that it appointed the Director-General in terms of the Bop Broadcasting Act.

The FXI was an affiliate of the Campaign for Independent Broadcasting (CIB), which fought hard for the recognition of the principle that broadcasters should be free of government control. To this end we successfully campaigned for the new Board of the SABC to be independent from the Government by a selection process involving public hearings. This ensured that the Board's mandate was derived from the public and not from the government. We also successfully campaigned for the establishment of the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) to regulate the broadcasting industry independently of the Government.

It would appear in this instance that these procedures and principles, including those of openness and transparency, have been utterly disregarded.

We understand that neither the staff of the BBC or its Interim Management Committee were aware that the regional government was considering the appointment of a new Director-General. They were expecting a process whereby a Board for the BBC would be established first in a manner similar to that of the SABC Board, and that this Board would appoint a Director-General in the normal way. This would include advertising the position of the Director-General publicly in the media.

The BBC has been without a Board for and a permanent Director-General since the civil uprising which led to the downfall of the Bophuthatswana government and the reincorporation of the territory into South Africa.

Letter to regional premiere, Mr. Popo Molefe about developments at Bophuthatswana Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)

23 August 1994

TO: The regional premier, North-West Government, Mr Popo Molefe. FAX: (0140) 843695

Copy to the Media Worker's Association of South Africa (MWASA)

RE: Appointment of Director-General to Bophuthatswana Broadcasting Corporation.

His appointment was also accompanied by the taking over of the administrative control of the BBC by the regional government by virtue of a proclamation approved by President Mandela and his Cabinet. The predecessor organisations of the FXI, the Campaign for Open Media (COM) and the anti-censorship Action Group (ACAG) were affiliates of the Campaign for Independent Broadcasting (CIB), which fought hard for the recognition that broadcasters should be free of government control. To this end, we successfully campaigned for the new Board of the SABC to be independent from the Government by a selection process involving public hearings. This ensured that the Boards mandates was derived from the public and not from the government. We also successfully campaigned for the establishment of the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) to regulate the broadcast industry independently of the Government. It would appear in this instance that these procedures and principles, including those of openness and transparency, have been utterly disregarded.

We understand that neither the staff of the BBC or its Interim Management Committee were aware that the regional government was considering the appointment of a new Director-General. They were expecting a process whereby a Board for the BBC would be established first in a manner similar to that of the SABC Board, and that this Board would appoint a Director-General in the normal way. This would include advertising the position of the Director-General publicly in the media.

We are deeply disturbed that this has not happened. We call on the North-West Government to allow the BBC to restore the Interim arrangement put in place during the transition to democracy in Bophuhatswana. The arrangement consisted of an interim Management Committee, with John Letswamotse as acting Director-General. This arrangement should last until a new Board of Governors is appointed through a process of advertising and public hearings. This new Board will then advertise the post of Director-General and appoint the Successful applicant. The ultimate future of the BBC should be decided by the IBA.

We urgently request a meeting with the North-West premier, Pop Molefe, to discuss this matter further, as we feel it is of paramount importance for the future of media freedom. Should this matter not receive urgent attention, we will be compelled to draw the matter to the attention of various local and international bodies, including the United Nations, the Organisation of African Unity, the Commonwealth and the Independent Broadcasting Authority.

Yours sincerely,

Joe Thloloe

Chairperson, FXI

Representations from the FXI to the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) on the protection and viability of public broadcasting services

1. The Public Interest

These representations are made in terms of Section 28 (8) of the IBA Act which in turn refers to section 45 (1).

We draw the attention of the IBA to the Primary Objectives of the Act under which it was constituted (Section 2). In particular we stress that the consistent injunction to the IBA is an overriding requirement to serve the "public interest". The following references under Section 2 heavily underscores that obligation:

Section 2 states: "The primary objective of this Act is to provide for the regulation of broadcasting activities in the Republic in the public interest though the Independent Broadcasting Authority established by Section 3...".

Section 2 then provides for the promotion of a number of objects where the theme is serving the public and the public interest, among them:

• Developing services which are responsive to the needs of the public (Section 2 (b));
• Ensuring that services develop and protect a national and regional identity, culture and character (Section 2 (c));
• Provide for regular news services (Section 2 (c) (ii) (aa)), actuality programmes on matters of public interest (Section 2 (c) (ii) (bb)), programmes on political issues of public interest (Section 2 (c) (ii) (cc));
• Ensure that the needs of language, cultural and religious groups are duly taken into account (Section 2 (c) (I));
• As are the needs of the constituent regions of the Republic and local communities (Section 2 (c));
• Refrain from undue interference in the commercial activities of licensees while at the same time taking into account the broadcasting needs of the public (Section 2 (n)).

It is therefore of paramount importance that the IBA be guided by public interest, and not merely by the sectarian and specific interests of broadcasters. We would submit that based on the reading of the IBA Act, the IBA is enjoined to regard the public as the most important stakeholder in broadcasting. Section 28 of the Act which instructs the IBA to conduct the so called "triple inquiry" enjoins the IBA to achieving the objects of the Act and applying the principles set out in Section 2, including those which we have referred to.

2. The Protection of Public Broadcasting Services

As no definition of the term "protection" is given in the Act, we presume that the normal meaning of the term is intended. According to the Oxford Dictionary protection means the act of "keeping safe, defending, guarding (a person, thing from, against danger, injury, etc.)".

We believe the issue of protection was inserted into the Act because of the recent history of the public broadcaster where it was used as a propaganda tool by the previous government and where that governments ideology was regarded as paramount and the interests of the public as of minor importance. Thus, the intention appears to be to protect the public from being misused or abused by the State or political parties or other interests to serve a particular ideology or other cause which is not in the public interest.

To achieve this, we believe, that the public broadcaster must at all times ensure that it conducts itself totally independent of the governing and opposing political parties in any of the national and provincial assemblies, political parties outside those institutions and of vested commercial and other interests which may strive to exert influence on the public broadcaster.

By appointing a Board for the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) by an open hearing process - as was done in 1993 when a panel of judges and other lawyers questioned candidates short listed from nominations made by the public from which they then selected 25 Board members, who were then appointed by the then State President, a measure of independence and protection from interference was given to the SABC. But it was not sufficient.

There was intolerable intrusion by the former State President who refused to appoint seven of the 25 candidates selected by the independent panel was forced, after a number of private argumentative meetings with the then State President or his representatives, to forward another seven names whom he finally appointed.

Further, during negotiations between the Campaign for Independent Broadcasting (CIB), a predecessor organisation of the FXI, and the former government, about the new appointment procedure of the SABC Board, the former government refused to appoint a selection panel consisting of essentially civil society representatives. They would only agree to a panel consisting of judges and other lawyers, so that such a panel was finally appointed.

In the FXI's view this was a seriously flawed decision because if the public broadcaster is to be expected to act in the public interest, then its controlling body should be appointed by people representing the public interest. While one judge or advocate could be regarded as representing a segment of public interest, a panel of lawyers is patently only representative of the legal fraternity and not of the public interest.

Such flawed procedures, if repeated in future, hold serious dangers of inadequate consideration of potential nominees because the legal panel representing only one segment of civil society, and who among themselves have very little knowledge of the role and functioning of broadcast media, cannot be relied upon to select the appropriate people to the Board. The inclusion of judges, given that they are ultimately appointed by the government, further introduces the danger of political interference by the governing party.

Therefore the following recommendations are made:

The IBA Act, or other suitable legislative instruments, be amended to provide for the appointment of the Board of the public broadcaster by the following process and to provide for the conditions attaching to the conduct of board members.

2.1 Nominations for board members to be called from the general public in the same manner as done in 1993 and with the same safeguards which excluded persons holding political office, persons with commercial broadcasting interests, etc. The criteria applied are similar to those contained in Section 5 of the IBA Act regarding membership of the IBA Council. The FXI is the custodian of documents emanating from the CIB and we can make available the list of criteria which was used in the appointment of the 1993 SABC Board. It may be necessary, however, to review some of the criteria in the light of developments since then. Such a review, however, should include broad public consultation. (Also see recommendation 4.9)

2.2 A selection panel consisting of 9 persons should be appointed from the ranks of civil society to consider the qualifications of candidates, and to draw up a short list of nominees according to the criteria referred to above. Short listed candidates should be interviewed in public and thereafter the panel should appoint the board. The State President or any other person holding public or political office must not have the powers to veto the appointment of the Board, or of any of the members appointed to it. It must be a pure civil society process. The underlying principle here is that the public broadcaster is independent of the influence of government or any political parties and so therefore the latter institutions must play no role in the selection and appointment of the Board of the public broadcaster.

2.3 The only area where we would condone a role for a political institution is in the appointment of the selection panel. The appropriate portfolio committee of Parliament (Communications), which is a multi-party forum, should call for civil society nominations from the general public of persons to be appointed to the selection panel. The same public and political office and broadcasting interest restrictions should be applied to members of this panel. The panel should elect its own chairperson. It would be desirable for public hearings to be held in the appointment of this panel.

2.4 The Board of the public broadcaster should be no fewer that 15 members and no more than 20. We believe the present number of 25 is too unwieldily.

2.5 To ensure their independence, Board members who have meetings with representatives of political parties either officially or informally must be required to issue public statements recording that such meetings took place and the contents of the discussions.

3. Mechanisms of Public Access to the Board of the Public Broadcaster:

This concept is implicit in the manner the current SABC Bard was appointed, and indeed the SABC emphasises the issue of its public accountability in its advertising. For instance, in the Weekend Star of December 3-4, 1993 the SABC placed a full-page advertisement, entitled "IT NOW BELONGS TO YOU". The advertisement says among others: "The SABC is becoming a different place. It began with the transparent selection of the board... We have vowed to be open, transparent and receptive to the views and opinions of society. Most of all we accept that, as the public broadcaster, the SABC belongs to the people of South Africa.. We're also making it our duty to be accountable to interact with you." Then it lists a telephone number which the public can call to voice opinions and raise issues.

We welcome such devices on the part of the public broadcaster and endorse all the abovementioned sentiments of the SABC. This is precisely our view too. But, there is no mechanism which obliges the SABC to be accountable to the public. In our view this is a serious shortcoming and such mechanisms should be introduced by way of law.

The only way any members of the public can have access to the SABC Board is if the Board agrees to meet them. Nothing compels the Board to do so. An if it does not suit the Board to meet any public group, or within a specific time frame, then it simply does not do so.

We therefore recommend the following:

3.1 That by law the Board of the SABC be compelled to hold four quarterly report- back meetings to the public every year and that in addition it releases publicity minutes of all its meetings. The public report-back meetings must be of sufficient format and duration to enable members of the public to comment and make proposals.

3.2 Further, however, there will be times when specific groups would like to meet with the SABC Board as a matter of urgency, and such requests must also be accommodated. Therefore, again by law, the SABC Board must be compelled to meet with such groups if the party requesting the meeting can submit 100 signatures in support of its request. This will prevent frivolous groups from approaching the Board, and will further show that there is a concerned body of people behind a request for a meeting. Such meetings need not be held with the full Board if this is not necessary or impractical, ad either the executive committee of the Board or a sub-committee of the Board could be authorised to conduct such meetings. We believe that the notion of public petitions is an important democratic device and that such a mechanism should be introduced in respect of the SABC Board.

These proposed mechanisms will help to ensure that the SABC is publicly accountable and responsive to the needs of the public.

4. The viability of Public Broadcasting Services

Attention is again drawn to the Primary objects of the Act in Section 2. In addition to the emphasis on "public interest" as outlined above, the FXI draws attention to Section 2 (d) where the IBA is enjoined to "protect the integrity and viability of public broadcasting services". As "integrity" is not defined in the definitions defined in the Act, the natural meanings are assumed as contained in the Oxford Dictionary - "wholeness, soundness, uprightness, honesty".

It is our contention that to meet these requirements - i.e. the paramountcy of the public interest and the uprightness and honesty of public broadcasting services, the financing of the services has to be considered with great care to ensure that these requirements are met and there is no failure in meeting any aspect of them.

In regard to SABC's viability - and the arguments about advertising that we apply to the institution apply equally to any other public broadcasting services - the current method of financing is from licence fees (about 20%) and advertising (about 80%). We contend that the public interest and the integrity of the public broadcaster is not served by financial reliance on advertising. Advertising requires a broadcasting service to "deliver audiences" and while on occasion this practice could coincide with the public interest (providing a programme which meets the obligations of either entertaining, educating or informing viewers) at no time can it meet the obligation of integrity. If a programme has to "deliver audiences" to an advertiser this means that the broadcaster no longer has "wholeness, soundness, uprightness and honesty" as a primary purpose. The primary purpose where there is advertising is the interests of the advertisers.

Because of the requirements to deliver audiences to advertisers, public broadcasters, like any commercial broadcaster, will tailor their services to the requirements of advertisers. And because of their reliance on the advertisers for income, the interests of the advertisers become paramount. We have seen this occur over the years at the SABC which has resulted in a service which is not determined by public interest, but by the interest of advertisers.

Reliance on licence revenue has proved to be impractical in South Africa. Indeed, the farcical situation has developed where more money has been spent on trying to collect revenue and prevent prate viewing than has actually been received in the coffers of the SABC. Circumstances suggest that no matter what methods are tried, there is unlikely to be an improvement in this situation. The actual process of collection is also time-consuming expensive and wasteful.

It is our contention that for both these reasons both advertising and licence fees are unsuitable methods of financing the SABC if it is to be true to its mission.

There is a view that by allowing some services to have a high advertising content there could be cross-subsidisation of programmes which would enable the SABC to carry out its public broadcasting functions. This argument is defective because it implies that the SABC will carry out public broadcasting on a limited number of its TV and radio channels while acting as a commercial broadcaster on the others. One would not be out of place to suggest that if this principle is acceptable, there is no reason why the SABC's commercial stations should not be turned over to authentic commercial broadcasters who could then be required (together with any others to whom commercial licences are granted) to provide the funds to the SABC for carrying out public broadcasting functions on a reduced number of broadcasting channels.

The problem, here, however, is that this could be regarded as inequitable treatment of commercial broadcasters. Another problem is that in drastically reducing the number of channels on which the SABC would be able to operate as a public broadcaster would seriously limit its ability to meet its obligations in regard to language, culture and regional diversification and educational programmes (Section 2(e)). Further, a significant sector of the public may regard SABC assets as public assets paid for with public money over many years and may not agree with proposals to sell them.

Accordingly, our recommendations on this issue are as follows: 4.1 The collection of licence revenue be terminated;

4.2 The principle of no advertising on SABC TV and Radio be accepted;

4.3 That the State meet the financial requirements of the public broadcaster through a multiparty consensus vote. Multiparty agreement would avoid the income being regarded as a gift from government;

4.4 That the State devise an appropriate method of raising money, either as a straight levy on all taxpayers (individuals as well as companies), or by raising VAT by a percentage figure, or by whatever appropriate mechanism can be found. The rationale for the State providing the funds for public broadcasting is that TV and radio broadcasting are essential elements of a modern society. It is no different in principle to the State's obligations in providing roads, water, education and health services.

4.5 If the State provides direct funding, this will further eliminate the need for separate complicated formulations of State funding of educational programmes, since this will be regarded as part of the overall public broadcast funding provided by the State.

4.6 The requirement that the public broadcaster serves the public interest carries with it an obligation on the State which also has to serve the public interest to enable the SABC to carry out that function.

4.7 Arguments that the State does not have the money at this time to finance the SABC cannot override the principle that it is the State's duty to provide this funding. But obviously this situation suggest that transferring SABC funding to the State cannot be done overnight and that this will have to be phased in. It is suggested that this be done by a reduction of advertising content on SABC programmes in stages over three or four years.

In elaboration of recommendation 4.7 it should be noted that since the SABC will not require channels to obtain advertising revenue to cross-subsidise its public broadcasting services, it can reduce its television channels from three to two. Two channels should be adequate for its public broadcasting functions. The third channel can either be sold or amalgamated with the other two, so that only two licences need to be grated to the SABC. The same principle should be applied to the SABC's radio stations.

Financing the SABC is this way will open up opportunities fro the IBA to meet its other obligations such as promoting diversity of TV and radio (Section 2 (a) and (b)), encouraging ownership and control of services by the historically disadvantaged and from a diverse range of communities (Section 2 (f) and (I)), ensuring fair competition between licences by being able to grant sufficient licences to create a competitive environment (Section 2(o)) and encouraging investment in the broadcasting industry (Section 2 (q)). State financing of the SABC will enable advertising revenue to spread among more TV and radio licences than would be the case if the SABC continued to absorb the major share of advertising revenue.

We have referred to the SABC as the public broadcaster. We regard the other public broadcasting services developed under the former "homeland" system as services which in future should be included in the national broadcaster's operations, enabling it to meet its obligations for the provision of regional stations.

We are, however, somewhat concerned that the attitude of citizens of such provinces have not been surveyed in any way as to what their performance would be - for broadcasters in their provinces to be incorporated into the SABC or to be retained as independent provincial broadcasting services in their own right. But from a financial point of view, we cannot see where provincial governments would obtain funds to fund provincial public broadcasters. As far as we are aware all of them are heavily subsidised by the state and/or their provinces at present. Should the state have to carry the burden of funding the national public broadcaster, it is unlikely that it will have further funds to allocate to provinces for provincial public broadcasters. Form this point of view, it appears to us unlikely that these services can be sustained independently on a provincial level and therefore we advocate their inclusion into the national broadcaster.

A further concern is that provincial governments may be sorely tempted to assert control over their provincial public broadcasters. a controversy already exists about the control of the North West government over the Bophuthatswana Broadcasting Corporation. If these services were brought under the independent control of the SABC in the way that we have suggested, i.e. under the control of the independently appointed public board, then these services would also be guaranteed their political independence. We fear that organisations such as ourselves with the support of regional groupings may have to fight one battle after another to secure the political independence of provincial public broadcasters should they fall under separate provincial government control.

What adds fuel to out concern is the inherent conflict in the Constitution and the Independent Broadcasting Authority Act. The Constitution has classified regional public media as one of the areas which can be delegated to fall under the control of provincial governments. In the case of the aforementioned BBC, control of the BBC has already been delegated by the central government of the North West government. There are signs that even provinces who do not have provincial public broadcasters may be interested in establishing these in their provinces.

Given our concerns about the independence of public broadcasters we would, on the balance of things, propose that all such services be incorporated under an independent SABC.

Thus there are further recommendations:

4.8 That all provincial public broadcasters in South Africa be incorporated into the SABC so that there is only one national public broadcaster meeting all its obligations.

4.9. That consideration be given to the inclusion of provincial representatives on the Board of the SABC to ensure that the interest of their regions are served by the national public broadcaster, thus, when the independent selection panel receives nominations from the public for appointment to the SABC Board, it will have to ensure that it includes persons from all nine provinces of South Africa, and that such people are suitably qualified to represent their provinces. Each province could further establish a Commission or regional Board consisting of persons to advise their SABC regional representatives on issues to be raised on SABC Board level. Such Commissions or regional Boards could be appointed by a similar process to that of the SABC board itself.

5. Conclusion

Finally, in view of our arguments we contend that those sections of the IBA Act which refer to commercial public broadcasters are in conflict with the Primary objects of the Act as outlined in Section 2 and we recommend that the Act be amended to take account of this contradiction.

FURTHER REPRESENTATIONS from the FXI to the INDEPENDENT BROADCASTING AUTHORITY on the PROTECTION and VIABILITY of PUBLIC BROADCASTING SERVICES related to the FINANCING OF THOSE SERVICES

We stated that reliance on advertising is contrary to the need for the public broadcaster to pay special attention to the "public interest". We contended - and have been supported by numerous other organisations - that in using advertising as a base the public broadcaster is primarily required to deliver audiences to the advertiser. In such circumstances, the "public interest" may be served at the same time, but it would be mere coincidence because the primary object is to sell advertising time to advertisers.

We also pointed out the unsatisfactory nature of other forms of revenue collection: the licence fee system is inefficient and is ignored by large numbers of viewers; it also requires an expensive policing system. The government subsidy for certain types of programmes provides only a fraction of the total revenue required by the SABC and, in any event, provides for programmes which could come to be regarded as government propaganda which is undesirable.

We made several recommendations in our previous statement but having given deeper consideration to our original proposals wish to focus and amplify on the following:

1) The collection of licence revenue be terminated;

2) The principle that there will be no advertising on SABC TV or radio programmes is accepted.

3) That the state meet the financial requirements of the public broadcaster through a mechanism where there is multiparty agreement on the voting of finance to avoid the monies coming to be regarded as in the gift of the ruling party.

4) That the government device an appropriate method of raising the money, either as a straight levy on all taxpayers, individuals as well as companies, or by raising VAT by a percentage figure which will provide the funds required or some other form of taxation. The basis on which this form of revenue-gathering is made is that public TV and radio broadcasting are essential elements of a modern society no different to the state's obligations in providing road communications or education and health services.

We wish to expand on items 3 and 4.

We believe that an efficient and simple method of raising finance for the public broadcaster does indeed lie in the hands of the state acting on a basis of multi-party consensus in the same way that the American Congress votes funds for certain purposes on a bipartisan basis.

The method is to include in the individual taxpayers' Return of Income form a small section devoted to broadcasting which requires the taxpayer to indicate whether he or she has a TV set or does not have one (a simple question with a request to mark an ‘X' mark in the appropriate box). The taxpayer who has a TV set is then required to add a specific amount -- a levy which is determined by the state in a multi-party agreement -- to the tax payable. If no tax is payable the levy is still payable and the taxpayer is responsible for paying it to the Receiver.

If the person indicates that he or she does not have a TV set, the appropriate mark is made on the form and no levy is paid.

For companies a similar routine is followed with an additional question: State how many TV sets are used in your company. The company would then be required to pay a levy of a certain amount, again decided by multi-party decision in the assembly. This amount could be a multiple of the individual taxpayers' levy or a reducing figure depending on the number of sets.

For hoteliers, people who hire out apartments, boarding-house keepers and other providing multi-room accommodation, the form would also request the number of TV sets in the bedrooms in addition to any others in the public or offices of the enterprise and a levy is imposed on the same formula as with businesses, or, perhaps, a separate formula is evolved.

In all there are 4 600 000 to 4 800 000 taxpayers in the country (including businesses and Site tax papers). Say this figure is reduced to 4 000 000 because a proportion of taxpayers do not have TV sets and therefore are not eligible for the levy. The number of hotel rooms in the country is 46 000 and the number of businesses with more than one TV set in their offices should bring the figure to, say, 4 500 000. This figure coincides with the estimated number of TV households in SA at present.

The current licence charge is R187 per year. If this figure were imposed as the TV or broadcast levy, the return on 4.5 million receivers would be R8 400 000. If the levy were increased to R200 (not unlikely given inflation) this would increased revenue to R900-million a year.

The current expenditure budget of the SABC amounts to R1 200 000 000. It is our belief that with advertising no longer the main revenue earner for the SABC, this figure can be substantially pruned by direct savings of costs as are detailed below and by a reduction of channels and radio stations, the number of which is no longer driven by the advertising imperative (which includes having sufficient air time to flight advertisements).

These are the direct savings at the SABC:

Advertising sales:

• Salary costs of the advertising sales management and teams for TV and radio
• Costs of advertising selling operations, etc - presentations to agencies and advertisers, entertainment of agencies and advertisers, etc
• Costs of promotional literature
• Costs of advertising in print media
• Making of TV and print advertising and promotional material

Licence revenue

• Costs of gathering revenue: printing and sending invoices to viewers and payments to post offices for collection
• Costs of staff at SABC administering licence collection (more than 100 people)
• Costs of monitoring homes to prevent piracy - at one stage estimated at R30-m a year
• Costs of advertising and other schemes to remind public to pay by due date
• There is also the incidental cost of answering calls and letters inquiring about licence payments

• Cheque, bank service and postage costs (these now all absorbed in one payment to Receiver which has to be made)
• Car expenses incurred in driving to post office to make payment
• Costs of penalty for late payment

There are no doubt other costs which we have not estimated.

Notes:

This scheme should enable the IBA to issue more than one TV licence which we understand the IBA believes it will be limited to if the SABC has to continue to rely on a percentage of advertising support for its financing. This is based on the perception that the advertising cake would not allow a further channel to be licenced.

There may be a number of people who do not pay tax but who have TV sets and these should be requested to apply for payment of the levy. There is no way - apart from expensive monitoring - to determine who these people are, but a proportion of this category of person, one presumes, would be prepared to pay the levy.

Monitoring may still be required, but this system should reduce it to a relatively small and inexpensive operation. The manner in which correct TV answers can be achieved on the Inland Revenue Return of Income Forms is to admonish that if incorrect returns are made (particularly by hotels and businesses) the penalties will be severe and this would be accompanied by a warning that spot checks would be made. But this is an area where reputable business and hotels are not inclined to transgress.

The Inland Revenue's Return of Income form could make provision for a question on whether a householder (or taxpayer) has more than one set in which case a higher fee is paid. We suggest it should.

The government of national unity could easily decide on a figure for the levy and one presumes there need be little disagreement. It will be clearly stated that the figure is one derived on a basis of consensus by all the parties so there is no suggestion that the SABC has to be subject to the dictates or whims of the majority party and become its servant. As the finance comes from the state, as distinct from the majority political party, the SABC's responsibility is to the people of the state, indeed the public interest.

When the debate on the issue of the amount of the levy - and it is the amount of the levy that the multi-party parliamentary decision is applied to, nothing else - the various political parties will have their opportunity to criticise the public broadcaster. It will then be for the public broadcaster to take note of what is being said - measured against its own research of the public's criticisms and the comments and criticisms of civil society and ordinary viewers - ans itself decide what it should do about them. As an independent body it makes its own decisions in accordance with the codes laid down by the IBA but, obviously, there must be opportunities for all sections of the public, civil society as well as politicians to make known their views on the public broadcasters' services. If this is done in a transparent manner and the SABC lives up to its objective of being an independent broadcaster, there cannot be any suggestion that the majority party will be able improperly to influence the broadcaster. There is also little scope for the broadcaster to go off the rails because of the pressure of public and parliamentary criticism and the watchdog IBA and complaints mechanism.

When the government of national unity comes to an end - if indeed this comes about - and the political system reverts to a majority party rule, the multi-party basis for setting the fee must continue to apply. Now the principle of consensus will be even more important. Whatever criticism is then offered of services will continue to be noted by the SABC which must then exercise greater care to ensure that it acts according to its conscience and principles.

We believe that if these procedures are followed the danger of funding from parliament - that is from the ruling party in parliament - is avoided. We emphasise the funding comes from all parties in parliament on the basis of consensus decision and thus it becomes a state decision. We say there is a crucial distinction between the State and the ruling party which has to be cultivated in South Africa - and, of course, it starts with the Speaker's role. This means that the public broadcaster is assured of acting independently of ruling political party influence (as well as that of other parties). To ensure this, the other suggestion that we made that formal and informal contacts between the SABC board and senior management and members of political parties (other than for news and discussion programme purposes) should be reported openly, should further guarantee the independence of the broadcaster. We believe that once the political parties enter into the spirit of such a decision-making process the ability of a party to exert undue influence will cease and the broadcaster will then be subject to criticism of its operations on the basis of professional and technical quality rather than party political bickering.

When it comes to improper influence, we have noted the threat by certain advertisers to withdraw their advertising from the SABC if it did not pursue a certain course of action. We believe that threats of that kind are almost as bad - if not equally as bad - an influence on the broadcaster as that exerted by a ruling political party. We, therefore, add to our previous views about the broadcaster maintaining its independence by suggesting that the way to avoid the possibility of advertising exerting undesirable financial and other treats against the broadcaster and so threatening its independence is to end advertising on the public broadcaster.

By removing commercial advertising form the public broadcaster and funding the institution in the way we have suggested (which should cost the taxpayer no more than he or she is - or should be - paying now) opportunity is created for more TV channels and thus, the other important IBA objective, of creating greater diversity and competition is achieved.

We believe that if the levy remains the same as the present licence cost or in that vicinity there can be no protest from the people that they are being faced with a new financial burden - indeed they might appreciate the savings in time, trouble and cost that the new system envisages.

The multi-party decision on the levy removes the majority party from any possible criticism or opprobrium that it is adding to taxes as the decision is a multi-party decision.

We have not been able to gain access to the SABC's detailed accounts to give financial chapter and verse on this proposal, so we believe that an immediate investigation be conducted with independent auditors into the feasibility of this scheme. We should be pleased to act as consultant or advisers in this process.

Finally, we believe that this simple scheme will obviate the search for other means of financing the SABC - such as an extra percentage on VAT (which we originally suggested) which we believe would be unfair on non-TV viewers or a tax on motorists or on electricity which would have the same serious disadvantages.

Freedom of Expression Institute June 19, 1995.

ANNEXURE 1

In dealing with the viability of Public Broadcasting services the Act requests that "particular reference is made to the financing of such services" should be made.

Attention again drawn to the Primary objects of the Act in Section 2. In addition to the emphasis on the "public interest" as outlined above, the Freedom of Expression Institute draws attention to Section 2 (d) where the IBA is enjoined to "protect the integrity and viability of public broadcasting services". As "integrity" is not defined in the definition contained in he Act the natural meanings are assumed (as contained In the Oxford Dictionary)- "wholeness, soundness, uprightness, honesty".

It is our contention to meet these requirements - i.e, the paramountcy of the public interest and the uprightness and honesty of public broadcasting services, the financing of the services has to be considered with great care to ensure that these requirements are met and that there is no failure in meeting any of them.

In regard to the SABC's viability - and the arguments that we apply to this institution apply equally to any other public broadcasting services - the current method of financing is from licence fees (about 20%) and advertising (about 80%). We contend that the public interest and the integrity of the public broadcaster is not served by financial reliance on advertising. Advertising requires a broadcasting service to "deliver audiences" and while on occasion this practice could coincide with the public interest (providing a programme which meets the obligations of either entertaining, educating or informing viewers) at no time can it meet the obligation of integrity. If a programme has to "deliver audiences" to an advertiser this means that the broadcaster no longer has "wholeness, soundness, uprightness and honesty" as a primary purpose. The primary purpose where there is advertising is the interests of the advertiser.

Indeed, because of the requirement to "deliver audiences" to advertisers the public broadcaster tailors services to the requirements of advertisers and these become paramount. We have seen this occur over the years at the SABC which has resulted in a service which is not determined by public interest but the interest of advertisers.

Reliance on licence revenue has proved to be impractical in South Africa. Indeed, the farcical situation has developed where more money has been spent on trying to collect revenue and prevent prate viewing than has actually been received in the coffers of the SABC. Circumstances suggest that no matter what methods are tried, there is unlikely to be an improvement in this situation. The actual process of collection is also time-consuming expensive and wasteful.

It is our contention that for both these reasons both advertising and licence fees are unsuitable methods of financing the SABC if it is to be true to its mission.

There is a suggestion that by allowing some services to have a high advertising content there could be cross-subsidisation of programmes which would enable the SABC to carry out its public broadcasting functions. This argument is defective because it implies that the SABC will carry out public broadcasting on a limited number of its TV and radio channels while acting as a commercial broadcaster on the others. One would not be out of place to suggest that if this principle is acceptable, there is no reason why the SABC's commercial stations should not be turned over to authentic commercial broadcasters who could then be required (together with any others to whom commercial licences are given) to provide the funds for carrying out public broadcasting functions on the limited channel.

The problem, here, however, is that this could be regarded as inequitable treatment of commercial broadcasters. Another problem is that in reducing the number of channels on which the SABC would be able to operate as a public broadcaster would seriously limit its ability to meet its obligations in regard to language, culture and regional diversification and educational programmes (Section 2(e)).

Accordingly, our recommendations on this issue are the following:

1. The collection of licence revenue be terminated;
2. The principle that there will be no advertising on SABC TV or Radio programmes is accepted.
3. That the State meet the financial requirements of the public broadcaster through a mechanism where there is a multiparty agreement on the voting of finance to avoid the monies coming to be regarded as in the gift of the ruling party.
4. That the government devise an appropriate method of raising the money, either as a straight levy on all taxpayers, individuals as well as companies, or by raising VAT by a percentage figure which will provide the funds required or some other form of taxation. The on which this from of revenue-gathering is made that public TV and radio broadcasting are essential elements of a modern society no different to the State's obligations in providing roads communications or education and health services.
5. As the public broadcaster is expected to provide educational programmes, this method of financing does away with complicated formulations to finance such programmes as they will be regarded as part of an overall public service provided by the public broadcaster.
6. It is contended that the requirement that the public broadcaster serves the public interest carries with it an obligation on the State which also has to serve the public interest to enable the SABC to carry out that function.
7. Arguments that the State does not have the money at this time to finance the SABC cannot override the principles which the government of national unity has laid down for the conduct of public broadcasting. But obviously this situation suggests that transferring SABC funding to the State cannot be done overnight and that this will have to be phased in. It is suggested that this be done by a reduction of advertising content on the SABC in stages over three or four years.

Financing the SABC in this way will open up opportunities for the IBA to meet its other obligations such as promoting diversity in TV and radio and responsive to the needs of the public (Section 2 (a) and (b)), encourage ownership and control of services by the historically disadvantaged and from a diverse range of communities (Section 2 (f) and (I)), ensuring fair competition between licences by being able to grant sufficient licences to create a competitive environment (Section 2 (o)) and encouraging investment in the broadcasting industry (Section 2 (q)). State financing of the SABC will enable the commercial cake to be spread among more TV and radio licences than would be the case if the SABC continued to absorb the major share of advertising revenue. The requirements mentioned above require greater participation by commercial services in broadcasting.

Representations from the FXI to the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) on cross-media ownership

General considerations on cross-media ownership involving broadcasters should be limited so that "information monopolies" are not created. Thus the principle has evolved that a newspaper in one city cannot own the broadcasters in that city, but may own a station in another city.

This is a formula that appears to fit the demographics and geography of a country like the United States of America more readily than others but the principle has merit and the Freedom of Expression Institute believes that it should be applied in South Africa as far as is practically possible.

However, we recognise that in certain instances the principle cannot be applied - the rural areas of the country are an example. Thus it is accepted that exceptions will have to be made but we submit that those exceptions must be withdrawn should the circumstances change.

Thus the overriding concept should be that no broadcast licences will be granted to an ownership where the outcome is the creation of a media monopoly - except where there is no alternative when certain conditions will be applied to the licensee.

In the big conurbations there are other factors which affect the definition of a media monopoly. These relate to the position a newspaper occupies in that environment - are there several newspapers, is it the market leader in its sphere and is it a daily or weekly? If there are only two daily newspapers in an environment would the granting of a licence to one give it an unfair advantage over its competitor?.

M-Net

The position of M-Net presents conundrum for South Africa in terms of cross-media regulation and the FXI is able to describe what the nature of the problem is and to hazard a solution. However, we appreciate this opportunity to be able to do so in a public forum, so that the issue can be presented for discussion, in the course of which, we hope, solutions will be arrived at.

The key to the problem will be a formulation of cross-media regulation which can be applied to M-Net without giving it unfair advantage and without threatening its viability.

M-Net came into existence as a consortium of newspaper interests which were given a special dispensation by the former government to obtain a television licence to enable them to recoup advertising revenue which was being enticed away from the print media by the TV services of the SABC. The decline in newspaper advertising revenue was dramatic following the introduction of SABC TV in South Africa and the financial viability of the newspaper groups concerned were clearly at risk. According to Prof Eric Louw of the Rand Afrikaans University, daily newspapers drew 33% of total adspend in 1977 which declined to 17% by 1992. In addition, the economy slumped from the mid 1970s causing total advertising revenue to fall.

The newspaper interests consisted of the four major newspaper groups which controlled the country's biggest daily and Sunday newspapers with smaller holdings for two independent newspaper operations.

This method of providing compensation for newspapers losing out on advertising revenue to SABC TV was, however, not as successful as was first thought.

The newspaper groups were required to invest large sums to enable M-Net to achieve viability and, in fact, dividends began to flow only four to five years after the start of the operation. Receipts in the first years of profitability offset that large investment. Since then expansion has again taxed the profits of the company and our information is that in reality the newspapers have had only one good year out of M-Net to compensate of the loss of advertising.

M-Net has been listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange sand its shares have been sold to a wider ownership, though newspaper interests still control the major portion of its share holding. Nevertheless, the decision to sell shares to a wider ownership is an important one, because it represents a departure of the principle on which M-Net was founded, namely only to compensate newspapers for the loss of advertising revenue.

Further, there have been substantial changes in newspaper ownership of M-Net over the last year. Independent Newspapers Plc has bought Argus Newspapers Ltd, but without the holding in M-Net. This holding has been retained by Argus holdings, the former parent company of Argus Newspapers. This means that nearly half of the country's English-language newspapers no longer have "access" to this mechanism of "compensation".

The only newspapers which now benefit from the M-Net share holding are those in:

• Nasionale Pers: Die Beeld, City Press, Rapport (50% owned);
• Perskor: The Citizen, Rapport (50% owned)
• Times Media Limited: Sunday Times, Business Day, Financial Mail, Eastern Province Herald, Evening Post and Weekend Post.
• Independently owned papers: Natal Witness and Daily Dispatch

The Argus Newspapers Ltd publications which no longer benefit include: The Star, Argus, Cape Times, Natal Mercury, Daily News, Sunday Tribune, Diamond Fields Advertiser and the Sowetan (part-owned).

Presumably the controlling shareholder in Argus Newspapers Ltd - Independent Newspapers Plc - believes that the profitability of these newspapers are no longer contingent upon the M-Net share holding.

This situation plus the fact that there has been relatively little "compensation" for the loss of advertising revenue, raise the question of whether the substantial breaching of the principle in the case of Argus Newspapers Ltd - namely the creation of a source of compensation for the newspaper industry - does not overturn the conditions upon which the licence was granted and therefore the fact of continued cross-media ownership in M-Net.

In addition, the future of TML at this stage is unknown. Anglo American has announced that it plans to unbundle parts of JCI to black ownership. This leaves an option for JCI or Anglo American to strip it of its M-Net shares and to relist it on the stock exchange as a new leaner TML. This would place it in a similar position to Argus Newspapers Ltd.

There is little doubt that the present monopolistic consequences of the newspaper holdings M-Net would be in contravention of most international cross-media regulations. Through the newspaper holdings in M-Net there are cross-media ownerships in virtually every city in South Africa. In the case of TML, the Sunday Times is a national newspaper with widespread circulation throughout the country. It is also the market leader. M-Net's reach is also national and therefore TML is distributing newspapers in virtually all the same towns and cities where M-Net is received. Clearly TML and M-Net are in contravention of international standards of cross-media ownership. TML's position becomes increasingly worse when one considers that Business Day is also distributed nationally as is the Financial Mail though cross-media ownership would probably apply more directly to these paper's roles in Johannesburg and Gauteng.

Nasionale Pers and Perskor face a similar situation in respect of their jointly-owned Rapport, also a national newspaper. For Nasionale Pers, the same situation exists in the Western Cape in respect of Die Burger and in Gauteng and adjacent provinces in respect of Die Beeld and City Press. Nasionale Pers could perhaps own electronic media in the Eastern Cape and in KwaZulu/Natal, but it would be barred from most others if international standards were applied. In addition, Nasionale Pers owns a number of consumer magazines. Perskor sells the Citizen in many areas in South Africa and would encounter problems in respect of this publication though these, too, would probably relate to Johannesburg and Gauteng. In addition, Perskor is the holding company of Republican Press, which owns a number of profitable consumer magazines sold nationally. In addition, it also owns a large stable of regional newspapers in towns and rural areas.

Argus Newspapers is well-placed financially to acquire electronic media interests for itself which the M-Net situation would enable it to do if it so wished and if the JCI operations included removal of TML's M-Net shareholding, it is not impossible that TML could find itself in the same position.

The question which arises from the M-Net situation is that if it is not resolved the IBA will find it impossible to make cross-media regulations for other media without being unfair? Can the IBA make regulations which say, for example, that a newspaper in Klerksdorp cannot open a radio station in Kelrksdorp, but only in another town? The M-Net situation makes a nonsense of any such rule.

FXI believes that the only solution is for the M-Net shareholding to be altered. One consequence could be to force the newspapers to unbundle their M-Net interests but this could pose problems. Will they get their money's worth. Recent experience has shown that SA businesses are not keen to but into the media - though their attitude may change when it comes to a TV station.

But another issue arises. While the newspapers have not made as much out of M-Net as they had hoped, the increase in commercial TV and radio stations that will emanate from the activities of the IBA will cause and additional drain on the total advertising cake and the newspapers may very well come to rely on the revenues that M-Net expects to earn in the future.

We come finally to the conclusion that the problem could be solved by the formation of a Trust to run M-Net and so enable profits to be channelled to newspapers. The condition would be that the newspaper groups would have no control over the M-Net trust. This may not be an ideal solution but it would provide a breathing space to assess the consequences until a final assessment of the situation could be made in, say five years or so. This is not a clean solution because the benefits of the operation - the profits - still flow to the newspapers but it does allow the principle of cross-media limitations to be applied elsewhere.

These measure imply consequences which the newspaper companies may not find acceptable. The selling of shares in M-Net may cripple M-Net and the Trust may not satisfy the newspaper companies which could argue that their money is tied up in an operation over which they have no control.

However, it is quite clear that the present situation in respect of M-Net cannot be sustained.

We wish to emphasise that we are not calling for the dismantlement of M-Net in this submission, merely that the present ownership structure may have to be altered.

We have some concern that the major shareholders of M-Net may argue that they each individually hold only a certain percentage of shares in M-Net, and that cross-media regulation should be applied through placing limitations on the amount of shares held individually by a newspaper company in another media operation. In the case of M-Net, however, it is the combined effort of the concentration of ownership by a consortium of newspaper groups which exacerbates the problem. In any event, as pointed out in this submission, every individual company is probably in contravention of international standards of cross-media regulation in respect of distribution patterns of their publications and the broadcasting reach of M-Net.

Another issue in regard to M-Net which further exacerbates the situation is the fact that it, according to our understanding, owns two TV channels.

This is excessive in a country which is seeking diversity of media. We cannot see any reason for a commercial broadcaster having control of two channels in the SA environment and submit that it be limited to only one channel.

Commercial media

However, in reality it is acknowledged that it is natural for media enterprises to diversify into other forms of media. It is often only media organisations who are willing to take the financial risks associated with the media industry. This is because they are more familiar with the specialised business approach called for. Particularly in the case of newspapers, it stands to reason that they may want to establish a radio station in the same town or area, because they already have a poll of journalists collecting the news and publishing the news. Such a news service could easily be adapted for radio broadcast purposes, and professional presenters and technicians may have to be employed, but there would be no requirements for additional field reporters.

We would urge the IBA to consider the granting if broadcast licences in such circumstances, and particularly if no other potential broadcaster exists in the town or areas, but with a specific condition attached. This is that should another licence application be received after a newspaper has already established a broadcasting station, then the new applicant should be required to show that it is financially and otherwise capable of running a broadcaster station. The newspaper owner of the existing broadcaster should be informed, that in the interests of diversity, it will be given a year's notice of the IBA's intention to require it to divest itself of the broadcasting licence. It's other option of course, could be to retain the broadcasting station and to sell the newspaper.

The general rationale above would be to prevent any cross-media ownership which results in a monopoly.

While the situation in a small town where there us only one media can be reasonably easily be ordered along the lines above, the issue becomes complicated in an area where there are many publications of differing types (dailies, monthlies, weeklies, Sundays, etc). Our suggestion is that the IBA will have to be flexible and consider the situation from the point of view whether a monopoly is being created. For instance, if a monthly journal decides to ask for a licence would this constitute the creation of a monopoly? We doubt it.

The situation becomes more flexible if there are several broadcasters as well as a range of papers. Within urban environments, the IBA will have to take into consideration the extent to which media diversity already exists, which means is could issue broadcast licences to newspapers where one or more broadcaster already exists. The wider Johannesburg area, fir instance, a newspaper seeking to open a radio station could not be accused of monopolising views and news, or the advertising market. We doubt, however, whether a general rule could be applied and suggest each application should be decided on merit.

Community media

However, should a community media operation in terms of its audience penetration attract the attention of a commercial media interest who may wish to take it over so that it could be turned into a profit-making commercial venture, then the normal principles of cross-media ownership should be made to apply to it.

Representations from the FXI to the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) on local content

We do believe, however, that local content regulation should be introduced for music, drama and documentary programming. We further believe that local producers should be encouraged to provide a South African perspective on international current affairs, and that this should be recognised and credited by the IBA as the regulator.

South African music, drama and documentaries have suffered seriously in terms if locally produced programming and as a consequence performing artists and producers have suffered in terms of development and exposure of their work. Local and international consumers of the performing arts have also been deprived of the opportunity to develop an appreciation of South African musicians and performers generally have very little informed appreciation of South African issues. The technical artists and workers associated with music, drama and documentary production have been relegated to local and international obscurity along with performing artists. The marketing of these types of programming have also been adversely affected. The disabling effect of this situation on the local broadcasting industry and on local performing artists and producers, we believe, can be more properly dealt with by spokespersons representing these industries and persons.

The lack of documentaries has further deprived listeners and viewers of the opportunity to take an in-depth look at South African and international issues from a South African perspective.

We believe that local content regulation should not limit documentary programming to South African issues only, but should be formulated to encourage South African producers to produce documentaries on foreign and international issues as well. Local content regulation would in this instance not be applied to the theme of the broadcast only, but would focus on the South African nationality of the producer, journalists, technicians and other production staff, etc.

The latter would be particularly relevant to documentaries on current affairs issues. South African viewers and listeners should have the opportunity of being introduced to international issues form a South African perspective, and not merely (as is currently the case) overwhelmingly from a United States or British perspective.

The latter is important because South Africa has become a member of various international bodies and organisations, including the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the Commonwealth and the United Nations (UN). South Africans as a people tend to be very inward looking. Our years of international isolation may have contributed to this. In order for our citizens to recognise that they are part of a sub-continent, a continent, the Commonwealth and the word as a whole, we need to be exposed to regional and international developments. However, such coverage must be made relevant to us as South Africans, so that we can recognise and understand our role in the world.

We are not necessarily asking for local content regulations to be placed on programming identified as current affairs, because his could cause a slanting of news, but we do think that these deal with international issues and when it can be shown that South Africans produced such programmes, this should count in the favour of a broadcaster when they have to account in terms of local content regulations. The concept of "local content" is somewhat misleading in this context. The issue here is that of programmes produced by South Africans for South African broadcasters. One needs to keep in mind that South African "local content" could theoretically also be produced by foreign nationals. This should not be prevented, but in terms of job creation and stimulating our own broadcasting industry, there should be recognition of whether South Africans as such are producing the programmes. These could be programmes on local issues as well as on international issues.

We are not addressing the issue of what specific quotas should be applied in terms of local content regulation, because the broadcasting producers, musicians and other performing artists are better qualified than us to determine their needs. But generally we think there should be higher quotas for music than for drama, although levels fore the latter must have the effect of increasing local drama production. Certain minimum levels for documentary programming should also be achieved, because these are nearly non-existent.

It must be recognised that local content regulation and further mechanisms to promote the production of programmes by South Africans, will lead to an increase in costs for broadcasters. However, if the programming is of sufficient standard it should be possible to sell these internationally, helping to offset these costs. South Africa has returned to the international community and in most instances trade sanctions have been lifted and markets have opened We would hope that regulation to increase local content and locally produced programming would act as an incentive to South African broadcasters to actively market their products abroad.

Legal Opinion - Representations to the Directors of Communication on setting up regional public broadcasters, April 1995

The IBA Act and the Constitution

(b) the Act of Parliament deals with a matter that, to be performed effectively, requires to be regulated or co-ordinated by uniform norms or standards that apply generally throughout the republic;

(c) The Act of Parliament is necessary to set a minimum standard across the nation for the rendering of public services.

David Dison, in a paper delivered to a conference of the FXI in October 1994, stated that public broadcasting services, as a form of public service, do require minimum standards across the nation for their effective provision and that this requires Parliament (i.e. the national Parliament) to set down uniform norms or standards regarding public broadcasting services, whether national or provincial, that will apply generally throughout the country. By using this provision of the Constitution, the IBA could be a national body issuing broadcasting licences, despite the fact that provinces are given legislative competence in terms of public broadcasting. This interpretation gives legal meaning to the provision in the IBA Act stating that IBA has jurisdiction over all public broadcasting in South Africa.

What then does the constitution mean when it gives to the provincial legislature legislative competence over provincial public media? Dison argues that this provides an opportunity for each province to establish provincial public broadcasting corporations in each province, separate form the SABC.

He therefore envisages a new Public Broadcasting Omnibus Act would set norms and standards that both national and provincial public broadcasters would be required to adhere to.

It would be a general enabling statute, allowing for a new SABC Act, a North Western Province Broadcasting Act, a Gauteng Broadcasting Act and so on. Each of the provincial legislatures would then be empowered and guided in the drafting of their own legislation particularly in the areas of the establishment process for an independent board, public hearings for such a board and so on.

Provincial Governments and Public Media

There are two situations a province could find itself in. (1) Where there is existing legislation regarding public broadcasting (basically TBVC states) and (2) Where there is no existing legislation e.g. Eastern Transvaal Province.

1) Where there is existing legislation

So, if there are existing laws which would need to be assigned to a particular province by the President, the Premier can request the President to do so. However, the province must have the necessary administrative capacity to perform the powers and functions in question. So, the province would need to already have or to set up the necessary bodies to administer, for example, a provincial radio station, using money from the provincial budget to do so. The President will not assign powers to the province in respect of an existing law without this being done.

For example, in the former Bophuthatswana (now North West Province) there was the Bophuthatswana Broadcasting Corporation Act which set up Bop TV. The NW province requested the power to administer this Act to be assigned to it. The Premier, Popo Molefe, requested President Mandela to assign the administration of the BBC Act to the North West Province. The NW Province had the necessary administrative competence to administer the Act, since the infrastructure of BBC still existed. By virtue of Proclamation No 110, 1994, published in the Government Gazette No 15813 on 17 June 1994, the President - in - Cabinet assigned the administration of the BBC Act 30 of 1989 to the government of the province of the North West. the North West Province was then free to amend the legislation in any way that they saw fit, for example, to set up an independent board to appoint the Director General of the Broadcasting Corporation instead of having the Minister of Media and Broadcasting appoint him as set out in the Act. (The province did not so amend the legislation).

2) Where there is no existing legislation

(I) Administrative competence required

This is not a legal requirement, but a practical one. Obviously, to have a law which is unable to be implemented because the provincial government lacks the necessary infrastructure to administer the law (for example, it could pass a law stating that it could levy licence fees for radio, but if they did not have the person power and administrative structures actually to collect such fees, and to fine those who did not pay, such a law would not be worth much). Therefore, before provinces start promulgating laws, they need to consider whether they have the necessary infrastructure and hence the financial means (i.e. allocation in the budget of the province) to administer the law.

(II) The IBA Act

If the IBA has national jurisdiction in relation to public broadcasting (And David Dison has argued above that it does), then before the provinces can begin public broadcasting, they will have to acquire a licence form the IBA. The provinces will then have to comply with the requirements set out in the IBA Act for the acquisition of licences. If the IBA does not have such authority, then presumably provinces could simply go ahead and broadcast. However, all indications are that the loophole IBA Act which has resulted in the confusion about the extent of its jurisdiction is going to be closed, so provinces would be advised to proceed as thought the IBA would have jurisdiction.

(III) The National Omnibus Act might override all provincial legislation

It seems that in terms of the Public Broadcasting Omnibus Act envisaged by David Dison above, the provinces should wait before enacting any legislation. The reason for this is that broadcasting is, he argues, something that to be performed effectively, requires to be regulated or co-ordinated by uniform norms and standards that apply generally throughout the republic, and that minimum standards for broadcasting need to be set across the nation for the rendering of this public service (as envisaged by section 126 (3)), the national Omnibus Act would take precedence over any provincial legislation which was enacted, and anything in the provincial legislation which contradicted the national Act would have to be scrapped.

It would therefore be better for provinces to wait for the Omnibus Act which would set out their powers and structures and then to act in accordance with this statute. However, it is theoretically possible, I think, for provinces to go ahead and start enacting broadcasting legislation, however, they run the risk that their legislation will be invalidated if it conflicts with the national Omnibus Act.

REPRESENTATION BY THE FXI TO THE INDEPENDENT BROADCASTING AUTHORITY on the provisions contained in the Draft Public Services Broadcasting Bill of 1996

Independence of the public broadcasting service from the government

29 January 1995

General observations and considerations

However, the FXI feels that the provisions in the Bill to achieve these objectives have weaknesses and require strengthening to ensure the fullest possible independence of the public broadcaster from these influences.

Recommendations

Further comment

Principles and guidelines for public broadcasting services

General observations and considerations

The strong emphasis on developing South African forms of expression and of presenting news and information from a South African perspective, while desirable, could force the service into a mould of parochialism. Provision should also made for entertainment and information to be broadcast in their original form and not subject to being placed in a strait jacket of conformity to South African values. The intention should also be for the outside world to be brought into South Africa and for the broadcaster to provide "a window on the world".

Recommendations

Section 5(1)(h): Without derogating from the requirements of Sections 5(1)(a) to (g), to also provide information about the world outside of South Africa from perspectives other than a purely South African one, so as to enable South Africans to be aware of and keep abreast of developments, issues and trends elsewhere and the thinking of the people involved in them.

Section 5(1)(I): Without derogating from the requirements of Sections 5(1)(a) to (g), to also provide entertainment and cultural programmes from the world outside South Africa so that South Africans may become aware of and keep abreast of developments and trends in art forms, drama, etc, to enable South Africans to be aware of and keep abreast of developments and trends elsewhere and the thinking of the people involved in them.

Procedure for the appointment of Board members of the public broadcasting service

It is strongly felt that the procedures outlined, despite being begun by an initial independent process, rapidly revert to placing control of Board members in the hands of a government organ - and this conflicts with the stated intention of maintaining independence for the broadcaster.

The government through the Constitutional Assembly has formulated a policy procedure for the selection of Constitutional Court judges which majority members believe ensures the independence of the Bench. This procedure provides for the Judicial Services Commission to make the selection and the State President to make appointments.

(According to a recent Sapa report, a conflict has developed between African National Congress and National Party members of the CA over this issue. The ANC position on the appointment of the Constitutional Court judges is that it should remain as it is at present. That is, judges should be recommended to the President by the Judicial Service Commission after careful consideration by that body. The NP suggestion that Parliament should play a role in these appointments is highly undesirable, given the principle that the judiciary should be independent of party politics. Giving the task of making such key appointments to Parliament would simply lead to the possibility of party political horse trading, Sapa concluded.)

In our view there should be consistency of policy in appointments to public institutions. The principle of using an independent body to make the selection in the case of judges should be carried over to the selection of Board members of the public broadcaster which is an important independent institution.

Recommendations

Section 6(3)(I): Service on the panel shall be for five years though it will only come together and sit as a panel when vacancies occur on the Board or when members retire by rotation and require replacement.

Chairperson and deputy chairperson of the governing board

General observations and considerations

To further strengthen the Board's independence the appointment of the chairperson and deputy chairperson shall not be done by an organ of government.

Recommendation

Appointment of the Chief Executive Officer

This section should make provision for the Board setting the salary and service conditions of the chief executive officer in accordance with the recommendation outlined on page 1.

Further provisions which should be added to the Bill at the appropriate places.

In the FXI's submissions to the IBA on the Protection and Viability of Public Broadcasting Services, we referred to mechanisms of public access to the Board of the Public Broadcaster. We repeat part of our submission here as it remains relevant.

"The whole rationale of the public broadcaster being independent of the government and political parties, and the Board being appointed by a public process, means that the Board is accountable to the South African public at large.

"This concept is implicit in the manner the current SABC Board was appointed, and, indeed, the SABC emphasises the issue of its public accountability in its advertising. For instance, in the Weekend Star of December 3/4 1993, the SABC placed a full-page advertisement, entitled ‘IT NOW BELONGS TO YOU'. The advertisement said, among other things, ‘The SABC is becoming a different place. It began with the transparent selections of the Board. We have vowed to be open, transparent and receptive to the views and opinions of society. Most of all we accept that, as the public broadcaster, the SABC belongs to the people of South Africa... We're also making it our duty to interact with you.' It then lists a telephone number which the public can call to voice opinions and raise issues.

"The FXI welcomes such devices on the part of the public broadcaster and endorse all the abovementioned sentiments of the SABC. This is precisely our view, too. But there is no mechanism which obliges the SABC to be accountable to the public. In our view this is a serious shortcoming and such mechanisms should be introduced by way of law.

"The only way any members of the public can have access to the SABC Board is if the Board agrees to meet them. Nothing compels the Board to do so. And if it does not suit the Board to meet any public group, or to do so within a specific time frame, then it simply does not do so.

We therefore recommend the following:

"3.1 That by law the Board of the SABC be compelled to hold four quarterly report-back meetings to the public every year and that in addition, it releases publicly, minutes of all its meetings. The public report-back meetings must be of sufficient format and duration to enable members of the public to comment and make proposals.

"3.2 However, there will be times when specific groups would like to meet with the SABC Board as a matter of urgency, and such requests must also be accommodated. Therefore, again by law, the SABC Board must be compelled to meet with such groups if the party requesting the meeting can submit 100 signatures in support of its request. This requirement will prevent frivolous groups from approaching the Board, and will further show that there is a concerned body of people behind a request for a meeting. Such meetings need not be held with the full Board if this is not necessary or is impracticable and either the executive committee of the Board or a sub-committee could be authorised to conduct such meetings. We believe that the notion of public petitions is an important democratic device and that such a mechanism should be introduced in respect of the SABC Board.

"These proposed mechanisms will help to ensure that the SABC is publicly accountable and responsive to the needs of the public."

In addition, we recommend adding a section dealing with the media. This should provide for meetings of the Board which deal with the policy of the broadcaster to be open to the media for reporting purposes. There will be instances where the Board will want to discuss certain matters in private and it can adopt the normal procedure of going into committee. However, the outcome of such committee deliberations must be made public at a general meeting. We include in that exclusion mechanism deliberations about the commercial activities and trade secrets of the SABC where a disclosure of such information to the general public could expose the corporation to unfair advantage by its commercial opponents.

And, finally, we request a further provision be inserted in both Section 3 and Section 4 dealing with the protection of the public broadcaster from government and/or political parties. The rationale of the provision is self-evident so it does not need further elaboration.

The section to be inserted should read: It is incumbent on members of the Board and the chief executive officer and his or her immediate deputies to report to meetings of the Board discussions or talks they have had with members of the government and/or politicians from the political parties. The date and time of the meeting, its duration and subject matter shall be recorded. The report to the Board shall be made available to the media. An exception to this provision is, of course, meetings by the News Staff in the gathering of news.