Public Broadcasting Campaign

Lobbying around the protection and promotion of public broadcasting.

Public Broadcasting in South Africa

The FXI has been engaged in activities around public broadcasting since its inception, and is continuing with this work. We believe that monitoring and activism around the role of the public broadcaster is especially important in this period, given the fact that the SABC is in the process of being corporatised: a process which we believe threatens the viability of its public mandate, especially of its radio stations. However, indications are that the macro-economic policy of the government has been impacting negatively on the public broadcaster and this policy is also driving restructuring at the Corporation at the expense of the public interest. Strong intervention is needed to lobby for protection of public interest principles and a strong public broadcaster that offers a diverse and dynamic service that meets the needs of the population and can contribute to nation building in South Africa .

The FXI, with support from Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, organized a stocktaking conference to assess developments within the SABC in November 2000. The conference, which had to proceed without the participation of the SABC after many attempts at securing their involvement, identified various areas where further research and work are required. The stocktaking conference resulted in various calls for such strong intervention. Many delegates also committed to mass opposition to any attempts to privatise any commercially viable sections of the public broadcaster.

As the most accessible and popular form of media, public radio requires particular focus. The Policy Unit has recently completed a research project with consisted of two stages: firstly, an assessment of the SABC from the perspective of employees, management, the regulator, the Department of Communications and the Portfolio Committee on Communications. Secondly, the public were engaged in assessments of the SABC through listener groups that will be established with community radio stations.

The FXI secured support from the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung for this series of activities around public service radio stations. These activities involved a combination of a research project and an educational campaign on the role of these stations. While the focus of the activities was on the public service radio stations of the South African Broadcasting Corporation, work was also undertaken on the relationship between community radio and public service radio in terms of their shared public service obligations.

The first stage of the research was conducted by the Policy Unit during 2001. This research revealed various organizational and capacity problems that limit the ability of the public service radio stations to meet the needs of their audiences. It is also of particular concern that public input into the SABC is virtually non-existent and the independent regulator has stated on more than one occasion that it does not have the capacity to monitor the implementation of the public mandate of the SABC. The overwhelming levels of public interest in the SABC stocktaking conference proved that the lack of public participation is due to an absence of relevant channels, not due to a lack of interest.

The second stage of the research was completed by the Policy Unit in December 2002. This research involving focus groups of listeners in all provinces, to popularise the existence of the Broadcasting Charter, contained in the Broadcasting Act of 1999, and to canvass audiences through carefully constructed audience research instruments.

Accountability

The FXI believes that work around enhancing the accountability of the SABC is timely, given the heightened public criticism about its performance. Even the Portfolio Committee on Communications has publicly criticised the SABC for failing its mandate, and it is clear that these sentiments are felt by many viewers and listeners as well. This rising anger presents both opportunities and dangers: opportunities in that it is fertile ground for the formation of a social movement, and dangers in that the government may use the space to lessen the independence of the SABC. The threats are ever-present, in spite of the fact that in terms of section 6(3) of the Broadcasting Amendment Act, '…the Corporation, in pursuit of its objectives and in the exercise of its powers, enjoys freedom of expression and journalistic, creative and programming independence as enshrined in the Constitution'.

However, the financial administration arrangements in government militate against such independence being realised. In reality, the SABC's independence is nominal, not substantive, and even this nominal independence is under threat on a periodic basis.

For example, a storm broke in late 2002 around the independence of the SABC, when the Department of Communication attempted to ensure the ratification of newly-developed editorial policies by the Minister of Communications (as the shareholder). While the Department backtracked after much public criticism, there are provisions in the Act and practices that call the independence of the SABC into question. The essence of the problem appears to be that while the SABC enjoys editorial independence from government, it cannot be said to enjoy institutional independence.

Control

In terms of the Broadcasting Act, which corporatises the SABC, the Minister has an extraordinary degree of control over the SABC's finances. This feature of the Act is puzzling considering the fact that corporatisation was supposed to introduce managerial autonomy from government, and also bearing in mind that a key principle of corporate governance involves a strict separation between ownership (the Minister) and control (the Board and management). According to the Act, financial regulations are to be approved by the Minister in consultation with the Minister of Finance, and the Minister must also approve the investment of surplus funds. The Minister will have the power to veto the amount set aside by the Board for cross-subsidisation.

In addition, a lacuna in the Broadcasting Act led to a situation in 2000 where Cabinet claimed the right to have final appointment powers in relation to the three key management positions at the South African Broadcasting Corporation (the Chief Executive Officer, the Chief Financing Officer, and the Chief Operating Officer). According to the Broadcasting Act, these management members will also be executive members of the Board. The Act states that the non-executive Board members are to be appointed by the President on the advice of the National Assembly. However, with respect to the appointment of the executive members, it is noted in section 14(1) of the Act that the Board must make these appointments, given that it states that ‘...the affairs of the Corporation should be administered by an executive committee consisting of the Group Chief Executive Officer and six other members appointed by the Board’. Although there is no procedure laid down for how the Board would handle the appointment of one of its own members (albeit an executive member), there are numerous fair procedural practices the Corporation could draw on to ensure the integrity of the appointment process.

Another law that affects the independence of the SABC is the Public Finance Management Act No.1 of 1999. The aim of the Act is to regulate and encourage good financial management in state institutions, including the constitutional institutions: these institutions are listed in Schedule 1 of the Act. These institutions are regulated in terms of Chapter 5 of the Act, which deals mainly with the fiduciary duties of the accounting officer (which in the case of the constitutional institutions is the CEO). The reason why these institutions are listed in a separate schedule, and fall within the ambit of Chapter 5, is that they are subject to less intrusive financial accountability obligations than other public entities: an important consideration from an independence point of view.

Other public entities that do not require the same levels of independence fall within schedule 3 of the PFMA. This list includes the SABC. Presently this list is not exhaustive, and is being treated as an open list, apparently, an audit is being conducted of all public entities to ensure that they are all listed. The institutions listed in these schedules fall within Chapter 6 of the PFMA, which contains a different set of fiduciary obligations to Chapter 5. For example, the accounting authority of an institution is obliged to submit a budget for the next financial year, as well as a corporate plan, ‘...to the accounting officer for a department designated by the executive authority responsible for that public entity or government business enterprise’ (section52). The accounting officer, or the Director-General, has the powers in terms of the Act to ‘...make recommendations to the executive authority with regard to the approval or amendment of the budget’ (section 53(2). With respect to reporting, the institution is required to submit an annual report to the relevant treasury, the executive authority responsible for that institution and in some cases to the Auditor General. The executive authority then tables the report in Parliament. This contrasts with the provision around reporting in Chapter 5, where constitutional institutions submit their reports directly to Parliament (section 40(1)(e)). Also, in terms of the Act, the Treasury is able to exercise a greater degree of control over public entities, whereas space is created for constitutional institutions such as Icasa to be able to issue their own financial regulations.

In short, the provisions of Chapter 6 are entirely inappropriate for an institution such as the SABC. However, in order for its independence to be upgraded to that of a Schedule One institution is very difficult as this Schedule is a closed list and refers only to the Constitutional institutions. This problem needs to be studied and solutions proposed.

Financial Independence

The financial independence of the SABC is also open to question. Currently it receives very little state funding, and this amount has been declining down the years. The SABC is overwhelmingly dependent on commercial sources of revenue, especially advertising which accounts for over 70% of its income. The income it receives from the television licence fee has wavered over the years, but accounts for only 15% of the broadcaster's total income. While funding through a licence fee may the preferred option for the SABC, as it makes the defence of the Corporation's independence easier (the fee is collected directly), it has proved to be unworkeable in the South African situation. The best option under the circumstances may be public funding via a direct transfer of funds from the government. However, this option carries with it obvious dangers for the independence of the SABC. Therefore a practical model needs to be worked out that enables the SABC to shift onto a publicly funded but independent model.

The dangers are obvious if these aspects of the model are not worked out simultaneously. By way of example of the dangers, the small amounts that SABC Education has received from the Department of Education has come with a high price tag for its independence; the unit is expected to submit all scripts to the Department for vetting. This arrangement is being extended to corporate and statutory sponsors of Education programmes. These deeply compromising arrangements continue unpublicised, as so much of the controversy around the independence of the SABC tends to focus on news.  

The SABC's independence problems are likely to intensify in view of recent developments. The ANC has passed a resolution at its 2002 National Conference resolving that the government must move towards establishing a public funded model for the SABC, characterised by cross-subsidisation. Public funding was necessary in order to reduce the SABC's reliance on adspend, and to ensure proper delivery on its language mandate. However, the public nature of the funding would not just be via direct transfers; this support would extend to parastatal sponsorship of local content and investment from different departments. In addition, a dedicated Parliamentary channel should be set up to increase access to government information, and that the SABC should be encouraged to establish alliances with other broadcasters on the African continent in furtherance of the goals of the New Partnership for Africa 's Development (Nepad). The SABC's programming also needs to be sensitive to gender, culture and the well-being of children.

The ANC set itself particular objectives, including the realisation of a public funded model by the year 2012. Within three years, the SABC must have close captioning and subtitling for the deaf, the Parliamentary channel must be established within two years, and within five years the SABC must ensure that its programming should be mainly local content and sensitive to gender, culture and the well-being of children. Also, in the next budget, funds should be allocated to establish regional television stations in line with the Medium Term Expenditure Framework. To these ends, the Department has invited tenders for a study on a public funding model for the SABC.

These are substantial advances, but also contain within them the possibility of control of the SABC via public funding. The modalities of such public funding need to be thoroughly researched, to enable the FXI to make practical proposals about how this funding should be administered.

The Policy Unit is planning to undertake research on these tricky questions, and the outcomes of the research will then form the basis for lobbying in the Media and ICT's Programme. According to the Broadcasting Act, the SABC is independent. Yet in reality, the Minister of Communications has extraordinary control over the Corporation’s finances. Also, cabinet appoints the three top management positions (the Chief Executive Officer, the Chief Financing Officer and the Chief Operating Officer) on the basis that the executive arm of government, as the shareholder, is required to do so in terms of a corporate governance protocol. The FXI has criticised this arrangement in the past, which received wide publicity, but now needs to ensure that the necessary amendments are made to the Broadcasting Act.  The Department of Communications also indicated that talks are underway with the SABC to develop new editorial policies for news and programming. While the concern being felt by the government is real – that is, that the SABC is not delivering on its mandate – this reason cannot be used as a reason to violate its editorial independence.

Lobbying Strategy

The above-mentioned research activities will feed into the lobbying strategy of the FXI, which will target the Department of Communications, the SABC Board, the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Communications and Icasa. The research will also result in a lobbying strategy for the newly-revitalised Friends of Public Broadcasting, a non-governmental organisation that facilitates public input into the public broadcaster. The FXI aims to support the re-vitalisation of FOPB. The aim is to provide a space where like-minded organisations and individuals can participate in the SABC and particularly will have a platform to participate in the restructuring of the public broadcaster. Ultimately, the intention will be to foster a social movement around public broadcasting. The FXI is in the process of completing a Niza-funded mission involving the organisation of listener committees that should result in the revitalisation of FOPB. This work, following on from the research undertaken by the policy unit, will be undertaken through this Programme.

The FXI is also becoming increasingly involved in debates around public broadcasting in Africa , as well as activities to ensure the transformation of state broadcasters to public broadcasters.One of the spin-offs of greater regional integration is that there is a drive on the part of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to harmonise legislation within SADC countries.