Rajagopal vs. State of Tamil Nadu

R. Rajagopal amd R.R. Gopal and Another vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Others, Writ Petition (C) No. 422 of 1994, Supreme Court of India, October 1994, JT 1994 (6) SC 514

Summary

A recent judgment of the Indian Supreme Court concluded that a public official cannot recover damages for libel for a defamatory publication about his or her official conduct unless he or she can prove that the publication was both false and made with reckless disregard for the truth. It is not necessary for a defendant to prove that the allegedly defamatory statement was true - simply that he or she made a reasonable effort to verify the facts of the statement.

Facts

The petitioners were the editor and associate editor of a weekly magazine published in Madras. They sought a court order restraining various state bodies from interfering with the publication in the magazine of the autobiography of a prisoner convicted of murder. The autobiography alleged, among other things, that public officials were implicated with the author in criminal activities.

Decision

The Supreme Court of India quoted at length from the landmark judgment of the US Supreme Court in New York Times vs. Sullivan (376 US 254 (1964)), which concluded that a public official can only recover damages for libel if a publication was false and made with a reckless disregard for the truth.

The Court next considered the judgment of the House of Lords in the United Kingdom in Derbyshire County Council vs. Times Newspapers Ltd. (1993 (2) W.L.R. 449). The House of Lords ruled that not only was there no public interest in allowing governmental institutions to sue for libel, but it was even "contrary to the public interest because to admit such actions would place an undesirable fetter on freedom of speech". Further an action for defamation or threat of such action "inevitably has an inhibiting effect on freedom of speech."

The House of Lords, referring to the Sullivan and other US judgments, observed: "While these decisions were related most directly to the provisions of the American Constitution concerned with securing freedom of speech, the public interest considerations which underlaid them are no less valid in this country. What has been described as "the chilling effect" induced by the threat of civil actions for libel is very important. Quite often the facts which would justify a defamatory publication are known to be true, but admissible evidence capable of proving those facts is not available."(Id., at 26-27.)

The Indian Supreme Court then noted fundamental similarities between the systems of government in India, the US and the UK: all demand "constant vigilance over exercise of governmental power by the press and the media among others. [This] is essential for a good government." (Id., at 30.)

However, the Court also noted that differences in the approach to freedom of expression under the Indian, US and UK constitutions "may call for some modification of the principles emerging from the English and US decisions in their application to [the Indian] legal system." (Id. at 30). Despite these differences (for example, Indian "society may not share the degree of public awareness obtaining in the UK or US"), the Court articulated a rule virtually identical to that set forth in the Sullivan case:

"In the case of public officials ... the remedy of action for damages is simply not available with respect to their acts and conduct relevant to the discharge of their official duties. This is so even where the publication is based upon facts and statements which are not true, unless the official establishes that the publication was made (by the defendant) with reckless disregard for truth. In such a case, it would be enough for the defendant (member of the press or [broadcast] media) to prove that he acted after a reasonable verification of the facts; it is not necessary for him to prove that what he has written is true." ... (Id., at 34-35.)

In other words, a public official bears the burden of proving that a defamatory statement was both false and made with reckless disregard for the truth. In defence, the media defendant needs only to show that he made a reasonable effort to verify the facts.

The Court appears to apply the rule to public figures as well because, like public officials, they "often play an influential role in ordering society" and have "access to mass media communication boht to influence the public and to counter criticism of their views and activities: (Id., at 24-25, 37). Moreover, the Court continued: "So far as the government, local authority and other organs and institutions exercising governmental power are concerned, they cannot maintain a suit for damages for defaming them."